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Britain's national health system (NHS) has been embattled since 
Thatcherism undertook to privatize it. This Britannic version of 
the new medicine is a hybrid of a neglected, underfunded 
shadow of the NHS and robust free-market capitalism. The NHS 
that the Tory government administers is aptly described as 
topless, bulging in the middle, and suffering chronic battle 
fatigue at the bottom. The quality of leadership in the NHS has 
plummeted at the same time thousands of middle managers 
have been added to prod the frontline caregivers. 
The Britannic New Medicine has thrown the medical profession 
into a deep re-think of its very purpose. Recently, the head of a 
major hospital trust announced: "A physician's first loyalty is to 
the hospital trust, then to his profession and then to his patients." 
The outcry from physicians was strong, but clearly the embattled 
profession is nearing exhaustion. "Everywhere big, ugly buyers 
are assuming greater power, consumers are more sophisticated, 
new technology is revolutionising practice, and old ethical 
issues are being broached in awkward new ways."1-4 The engine 
of change that is afoot is found throughout society-it faces 
lawyers, accountants, civil servants, university faculty, and now 
quite acutely, doctors. In business the new arena is global and the 
conditions for survival are unclear and ever-changing requiring 
continuous retooling, redundancies, and retraining. In health 
care a major feature of this new era is that these sea-changes are 
taking place in a world where resources for medicine are limited. 
Problems of resource allocation within medicine arise at a 
number of different levels. How much of a society's resources 
should be devoted to health care at all, as opposed to housing or 
defense? Given some overall allocation of resources to health 
care, how should these resources be distributed among various 
different sorts of health care expenditure: For example, primary 
versus hospital care, or preventive medicine versus care of the 
already ill. Within such broader categories, how should different 
specializations be allocated: For example, in the case of hospital 
medicine between cardiac and obstetric units. And both within 
and across specializations, what should be the relative allocation 
for different specific forms of treatment: Kidney transplants 
versus renal dialysis or hip replacements versus by-pass surgery. 
Questions of this sort are lumped together as problems of 
macroallocation. When faced with the relevance of the cost of 
care, the morally squeamish invoke the macro/micro distinc-
tion, asserting that economic considerations are morally rel-
evant only to macro allocation decisions and that cost has no 
relevance in the micro medical/moral decisions of clinical 
practice. 
Health Economists' Proposal of QALYs 
Health economists have devised a vehicle for resource alloca-
tion-the Quality Adjusted Life Year or QALY. The QAL Y 
analysis in the eyes ofNHS managers is now on even terms with 
the status quo decision making which has been characterized as 
MSW (management by shroud waving). In the words ofMooney: 
"MSW where individual clinicians press for more resources for 
their patients by 'announcing publicly that unless resources are 
increased patients will suffer and die unnecessarily.' Each 
individual clinician has, after-all, spent his professional life 
assessing his patients' distress and disability and the risk to their 
lives posed by disease. "5 MSW calls on the physician's abilities 
as ravers rather than reasoners, and thereby leaves them search-
ing for a better method for allocation decisions. 
Economists with an interest in health care introduced the 
concept of QAL Y in the 1980s as the key to rational resolution 
of resource allocation decisions in a time of scarcity. Initially, 
such economists offf<red Q AL Y s as a cure for the haphazard or 
otherwise ethically inappropriate allocation of scarce medical 
resources without distinguishing between macro and micro 
allocation decisions. Currently, most major advocates see QAL Y s 
as a macro allocation tool while others would apply it throughout 
health care including case-by-case decisions in clinical prac-
tice.6-10 
The health economist argues that we should prioritize inter-
ventions in terms of the quantity of well life measured in quality 
adjusted life years (QAL Y s) produced by the intervention per 
unit of cost. This implies that an intervention that takes N people 
from a bad condition (including dying) to the state of healthy for 
X years should have priority over an intervention that takes N 
other people from the same bad condition to a state of moderate 
illness for the same number of years. This sort of analysis gives 
confidence to resource managers, and those who have a 
consequentialist view of morals. There does seem to be some-
thing right about an attempt to rationalize the allocation of scarce 
medical resources, to examine our priorities in light of argument 
and evidence of their relative efficacy. The health economist 
view as represented by Alan Williams appears positively be-
nign: "The objective of economic appraisal is to ensure that as 
much benefit as possible is obtained from the resources devoted 
to health care." 11 
Elaboration of QAL Ys 
A natural response to allocation problems is to say: One should 
put one's resources where they will do the most good. Perhaps 
one should, but what does one mean by "the most good"? One 
kind of good that health care can achieve is saving lives. So one 
measure, albeit a very crude one, of the good that health care 
does would be the overall extension of life expectancy that it 
generates: Years of life gained. This is where QAL Y s come in. 
An extended passage from Britain's major advocate ofQALYs 
is in order. 
"The essence of a QAL Y is that it takes a year of healthy life 
expectancy to be worth 1, but regards a year of unhealthy life 
-
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expectancy as worth less than I. Its precise value is lower the 
worse the quality oflife of the unhealthy person (which is what 
the 'quality adjusted' bit is all about). If being dead is worth 
zero, it is in principle, possible for a QAL Y to be negative, ie, 
for the quality of someone's life to be judged as worse than 
being dead. 
The general idea is that a beneficial health care activity is 
one that generates a positive amount of QALYs, and an 
efficient health care activity is one where the cost per QAL Y 
is as low as it can be. A high priority health care activity is one 
where cost-per QAL Y is as low as it can be. A high priority 
health care activity is one where cost-per-QAL Y is low, and 
a low priority activity is one where cost-per-QAL Y is high. 
Thus an activity that generates only two QAL Y s but costs only 
£200 (so that each Q AL Y costs £1 00 to produce) is more 
efficientthan one that generates 5 QAL Y s but costs £2,000 (so 
that each QALY costs £400 to produce). 12 
What is new or special about QAL Y s? The QAL Y is a measure 
which: First, combines a) life expectancy, b) quality oflife, and 
c) reflects the values of the community served; second, it is 
welfarist, ie, designed to promote the greatest welfare (health) of 
the community served; third, it incorporates democratic and 
equalitarian features; and fourth, it is a rational/objective deci-
sion procedure-as scientific as one can get in the social 
sciences. 
There are four assumptions that are required for a QAL Y 
analysis: 1) objective of health care system is to improve health, 
2) the general public is competent to express its preferences on 
health, 3) it is possible to elicit meaningful valuation statements 
from people about differing degrees of health, and 4) it is 
possible to aggregate these valuations. 
How are QAL Y s constructed or computed? Williams points to 
research that shows there are numerous ways for health econo-
mists to do this, one of which is called the Rosser illness states 
index. The initial phase of obtaining the "quality adjustment" 
involves Rosser's system of describing eight states of health13 
and four degrees of distress (none, mild, moderate, and severe). 
These illness states are meant to be very general so that they 
could cover a wide range of actual experiences of ill-health. 
Matched with the four distress levels the illness states generate 
32 possible disability-distress states. 
Rosser obtains the values (Table 1) by asking participants to 
rank 29 states (three lack meaning) in order from best to worst. 
State I -A (No disability, no distress) is clearly the best, but views 
vary considerably about the worst state. Respondents are to 
assign" 1" to the healthy state, "0" for death, and a negative value 
for worse than death. Thus one might assign a .5 to state VI-C, 
with the implication that two years of life expectancy in that 
condition is of equal value to one year of healthy life expectancy. 
The values found on the table provide the matrix derived from 
70 respondents. The concept of QAL Y s does not depend on 
acceptance of Rosser's index, many others have been devised by 
busy social scientists. At this point we need only grasp what 
these health care economists are up to. 
Once we get this far it is a matter of arithmetic. We take what 
we know about the costs of procedures, probability of outcomes 
of treatments/procedures, and with the Rosser index, we are able 
to compute the QAL Y and the comparative efficiency of our 
medical efforts. A hypothetical example from Williams and his 
formula: "A treatment may offer a 0.8 probability oflO QAL Y s, 
a 0.1 probability of none, and a 0.1 probability of -5 QAL Y s (ie, 
the loss of the equivalent of five years of healthy life 
-
Table 1.- Rosser's Valuation Matrix: 70 Respondents 
DISABILITY DISTRESS RATING 
RATING 
A B c D 
I 1.000 0.995 0.990 0.967 
II 0.990 0.986 0.973 0.932 
Ill 0.980 0.972 0.956 0.912 
IV 0.964 0.956 0.942 0.870 
v 0.946 0.935 0.900 0.700 
VI 0.875 0.845 0.680 0.000 
VII 0.677 0.564 0.000 -1.486 
VIII -1.028 N/A N/A N/A 
Fixed points: Healthy = 1 , Dead = 0 
expectancy) ... we could say that the 'expected' value of the 
benefits from treatment is (0.8x10) + (0.1x0) + (0.1x-5) which 
is 8 + 0 - -0.5 or 7.5 QALYs." 14 Given adequate information 
health economists can generate tables that report the "cost per 
QAL Y" of practices and procedures from family practitioner's 
advice to stop smoking to hospital dialysis (Table 2). 
Advocates of the QAL Y approach are quick to point out that 
they are not offering a precise answer to the question, how many 
QAL Y sa given period oflife adds up to. Rather they are offering 
a rational approach to determine how resources should be 
allocated. Not only does their method reveal that some treat-
ments are more cost-effective that others, but it produces the 
same outcome even if we experiment with the assignment of 
values we put in the equation. This is part of what Williams 
Table 2.-Cost per QALY Estimates for North America 1983 Data 
Procedure 
Coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) 
for left main coronary artery disease 
Neonatal intensive care (1000 to 1499 gm) 
T 4 (thyroid screening) 
Treatment for severe hypertension in men aged 40 
plus (diastolic 105 mm Hg) 
Treatment for mild hypertension (94 to 105 mm Hg) 
Estrogen therapy for post-menopausal symptoms in 
women without prior hysterectomy 
Neonatal intensive care (500 to 999 gm) 
CABG for single vessel disease, moderately severe 
School tuberculin testing program 
Continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis 
Hospital dialysis 
Cost per OAL Y 
4,200 
4,500 
6,300 
19,100 
19,100 
27,000 
31,800 
36,000 
43,700 
47,100 
54,000 
Table distributed at a BMA conference, 1986, Oxford, England 
meant earlier when he says that the QAL Y analysis does not 
depend on the Rosser index, other indexes result only in differ-
ences in degree and leave in tact the rankings of treatments as 
found on Table 2. Given the situation of limited resources and 
more than enough beneficial procedures to exhaust resources, 
some beneficial procedures cannot be undertaken. QAL Y s 
provide us with an objective guide to make the needed choices. 
It is difficult to sustain a convincing skepticism about a 
proposal that offers a method that reveals a way to select among 
treatments/procedures which will confer greater aggregate ben-
efit than less.lt is for this reason thatthe QAL Y analysis is being 
taken seriously in decisions regarding allocation. But this is not 
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to say that QAL Y considerations should be regarded as decisive. 
QAL Y s need to be measured against considerations of just 
distribution of the harms and benefits. 
Supposing that we are clear about what it is that we are trying 
to measure, there would still be room for considerable skepti-
cism about the extent to which it was possible to measure it. The 
idea of putting a yardstick up against a life and reading off some 
numerical value representing its quality is worrisome, if not 
preposterous. Philosophers have long debunked the efforts of 
those who have attempted to divine ways to compare the value 
of one year of life under circumstances A with those of circum-
stance B even if it were the same life. It is clear that the QAL Y 
analysis involves troublesome interpersonal comparisons and 
asserts that it is a common measure in which everyone's claims 
of happiness are in some sense comparable and additive. This is 
a classical problem for utilitarian efforts to compare "utilities" 
and the health care economists seem to be up to much the same 
business. Many of the numerous objections to classical utilitari-
anism have a bearing on the plausibility of the efforts of the 
health economists. The ongoing discussion about utilitarian 
theory is robust, indicating that many issues are still quite 
unresolved. 15 
Doubts about QAL Ys 
Economists say that in allocation decisions the key question is 
a matter of efficiency, more health for the same money. The 
health economists seem to be engaged in a bit of covert imperi-
alism by eclipsing the ethical dimension of the question for 
which there is no scientific (economic) answer. Furthermore, 
the apparent objectivity of the economic approach is very 
seductive to those who have budget targets to meet and thereby 
is extremely dangerous. 
The problem of ranking values is an ancient one and a great 
deal of human genius has been expended an effort to quantify 
value. The ancestry of the modem efforts is easily traced to the 
British utilitarian philosophers and social reformers, most fa-
mously, Jeremy Bentham. 16There is rich literature detailing the 
unsatisfactory efforts to develop afelicific calculus. 
Who's pleasure (happiness) is to count? Well anybody's and 
everybody's. The objective of government is to create a har-
mony of interests such that the happiness of as many people as 
possible is promoted. Where arianism goes wrong is that it is 
promoting happiness in the abstract rather than the happiness of 
persons (it separates the individuals from the happiness by 
abstracting the happiness). Utilitarianism is the combination of 
welfarism, sum-ranking, and consequentialism. Such a theory 
separates value from valuers and merges the utility bits together 
as one total lump. Welfare economics and preference theory are 
efforts to overcome these difficulties. 
Some concerns that shed serious doubts on the moral status of 
this method of resource allocation: The concerns can be ar-
ranged as 1) questions about valuing, 2) the distinction between 
descriptive and normative ethics and the relevance of democ-
racy to morals, 3) questions about justice, and discrimination 
against the elderly and the disadvantaged. 
Questions about Valuing 
Recently there have been numerous efforts to determine what 
we value in health care and how we would rank services and 
interventions. The community consensus-building method used 
in Oregon to rank health care interventions is one effort. Social 
scientists have conducted numerous studies to establish health 
-
indexes. A study conducted in New York of health graduates 
and health professionals had results that should raise doubts 
about objective, democratic efforts to determine preferences.17 
The subjects were asked to assign numerical values to saving 
lives of people in different states of illness in relation to saving 
lives of healthy people. The priority was clearly for the healthy. 
For instance, saving the life of a healthy person was considered 
approximately equivalent to saving the lives of two people with 
visual impairment, and three people sitting in wheelchair and 
unable to work. 
Recent studies in Norway suggest that Norwegians reject the 
primary value of health economists, efficiency, in favor of life 
itself. 18 Thus, efforts to prioritize on the basis of gained life years 
is rejected as incommensurable with gained lives. The vast 
majority in this study held the view that individuals are equally 
valuable and equally entitled to treatment irrespective of differ-
ences in their health or levels of disability. 
The health economists are quick to point out that the QAL Y 
approach is not dependent on any particular index. But from the 
two examples mentioned a very pressing question comes to 
mind: What is it that we have when we have the QAL Y s based 
on any index? What is the moral basis or foundation for this 
standard? Whether we use the Rosser, New York, Norwegian, 
Oregon, or other indexes19 what we have is a standard based on 
a quantification of the values of those in the study. Nothing 
more. 
If we are a mean society we will do X, if we are sympathetic, 
we will do Y. Such an analysis does not tell what we ought to do, 
nor does it tell that X or Y is morally defensible. Niggardly and 
liberal societies will produce different QAL Y s. 
Another concern that must be mentioned has to do with our 
ability to measure "quality of life" in any meaningful way. Part 
of the skepticism about any index thatthe health economists will 
use is based on doubts about measuring "quality." There are 
serious unresolved problems about quality measurements, espe-
cially interpersonal comparisons and evaluations. These in-
dexes at best tell us about the people who participate. If you 
change the life experi.ence of the index -making group, you could 
get very different results. The views of cancer patients, quad-
riplegics, New Yorkers, Norwegians, Oregonians, etc, on the 
quality and value of their respective lives are very interesting but 
certainly incommensurable. And surely there is something ut-
terly preposterous and morally outrageous about the health 
managers who take seriously the New Yorkers' view that my life 
is worth the life of three wheelchair-bound people. Something 
has gone wrong with the new math of health economics that it 
could support such a view. Yet the QAL Y math of the advocates 
of the new medicine implies this as well as other moral outrages. 
Descriptive and Normative Ethics 
Two points need to be made at this juncture. First, the outcome 
of such studies are merely a reflection of the different study 
groups. Surely the inheritances of the past and the differences in 
cultural conditioning affect the preferences of the subjects. The 
Norwegian adherence to the principle of equal entitlement to 
treatment has long been reflected in their national health service 
with very limited out-of-pocket payment. Thus they do not make 
good subjects for QAL Y index studies. On the other hand it is not 
surprising that in the American studies economic considerations 
are emphasized in these indexes of values. Bernard Williams 
points out: "Utilitarianism is not surprisingly the value system 
for a society in which economic values are supreme; and also, at 
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the theoretical level, because quantification in money is the only 
obvious form of what utilitarianism insists upon, the commen-
surability of value."20 The differences between the New York 
and the Norwegian study does not surprise and raises serious 
doubts about the "objective quality" of the QAL Y standard for 
allocation decisions. 
The echo of utilitarian ethics runs strong through the QAL Y 
approach. In its narrowest form utilitarianism seeks the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number when happiness means plea-
sure and absence of pain. The health economists seek to elimi-
nate inefficiency (reduce pain at the lowest cost) through discov-
ery of a common measure, QAL Y s. But a central element of the 
common measure that they have devised is an uncritical account 
of the attitudes and values of the subjects of the index generating 
studies. 
Second, ethicists are not given to doing ethics by opinion poll 
or the results of social scientists' descriptive studies. Allocation 
decisions based on QAL Y s utilize a democratic approach of 
determining the values of society and conclude that such an 
allocation is morally right. Such a conclusion does not follow. 
Even if their index was sufficiently representative and free from 
value loading by the evaluators that does not justify the move 
from an account of what their sample believes about states oflife 
to how resources ought to be allocated. If their index is of how 
matters ought to be, the question remains what makes demo-
cratic majorities morally right? If on the other hand the index 
does not purport to tell us "how matters ought to be," then the 
health economists are not addressing our ethical problem. They 
are not answering the question: What would be a morally 
defensible allocation? Rather they are telling us here is an 
objective method of determining what collectively we would do. 
Mind you, not what we ought to do, just what we would do to 
most efficiently use our resources. 
Reformers and advocates for the disadvantaged in society 
know better than appeal to what is commonly done or thought. 
The status quo is what they are trying to change. Rather they 
appeal to moral or legal arguments in order to obtain equal or 
sensitive treatment. Descriptive morality does not answer the 
normative question. 
Questions about Justice 
Allocation according to QAL Y s seemunjust in that it would 
favor those who are more healthy or fortunate. Unlike the 
classical utilitarianism of Bentham where "everybody to count 
for one, nobody to count for less than one," the health econo-
mists by counting QAL Y swill allocate to the fortunate, healthy, 
or young over their unfortunate, unhealthy, or elderly counter-
parts. Consider two candidates for a treatment where the only 
difference is that one is suffering from a condition (say, emphy-
sema) unrelated to the immediate problem and the other is not. 
Assume that the quality of life of the emphysema patient is 
significantly impaired but there is no reason to suppose it will in 
any way affect the chances of the treatment under consideration 
proving successful. Assume also that both patients have an 
equally intense wish to go on living. Under the QAL Y assign-
ment of resources the treatment goes to the person without the 
emphysema. It is a straightforward matter of arithmetic and 
probabilities. The QAL Y value for the treatment goes up for 
every year the one person is likely to live over the other. Clearly 
this system favors the fortunate and visits further misfortunes on 
the unfortunate by denying benefits in allocation decisions. 
A parallel account works for age or any disability that shortens 
a person's life. Replace "emphysema" with "age/older" and you 
get the same result. Other things being equal, more QAL Y s are 
generated by expenditures on the young than the old and on the 
healthy than on the disabled. QAL Y s favor the young and the 
more healthy in any given selection. 
A central value of health care has always been to assist those 
most unfortunate. Paying attention to the unfortunate, those 
whom nature has dealt a poor hand, has long been a measure of 
the moral quality of a society. Theories of social justice, cer-
tainly since Rawls,21 have had to be sensitive to a principle that 
requires that those least well off must be benefited if anyone else 
in society is to benefit. The health economists' QAL Y allocation 
scheme is not only utterly blind to this principle of justice, 
QALYs fail to require that the worst-off groups' level of 
well-being is raised whenever another groups' is to be raised. In 
fact they allocate in a manner that often increases the disadvan-
tages of those with whom nature has dealt harshly. Rejecting 
QAL Y s as an allocation tool Harris enjoins: "What we should 
not do is abandon those whose quality is poor to concentrate on 
the fortunate. QAL Ys require us to do precisely this."22 
Williams has denied that QAL Y s are ageist by pointing out 
that they support the funding of hip replacements, an interven-
tion overwhelmingly for the elderly. This denial is unconvincing 
because the ageism remains within the group in need of hip 
replacements, other things being equal, the QAL Y approach 
would select the youngest candidates. There is a sense that 
QAL Y s themselves are not ageist or sexist or anything but blind, 
and their outcome takes us back to decisions insensitive to our 
sympathies for our fellow humans. Whereas Rawls' theory of 
justice has firmly advanced the difference principle, (if we are 
to treat people differently, then the least well off must benefit 
from such treatment), the QAL Y accounts have retreated even 
from Bentham's equalitarian concept of justice. As Brock has 
pointed out in discussing quality adjustments for significant 
group differences: " ... a lower quality is assigned to life years for 
the elderly, or for seriously disabled or handicapped groups, 
than to life years for normal adults."23 
This explanation of the QAL Y approach and analysis chal-
lenges the ethical suitability of QAL Y s, in both macro and micro 
health care allocation decisions. This discussion suggests that 
whatever the mechanism of allocation it must pass the con-
straints imposed by ethical considerations of social justice. 
Furthermore, we have come to see that in QAL Y s health 
economists have found an efficient way to do the wrong thing. 
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Some Ethical Principles for Adult 
Critical Care 
Kenneth Kipnis PhD, Anita Gerhard MD 
State of the art in approaching several of the most disturbing 
problems involving end-of-life decision-making in an intensive 
care setting is applicable to other contexts as well. Developed 
as part of the curriculum at the John A. Burns School of Medicine 
at the University of Hawaii, the material is intended as a reflection 
of current work in health care ethics, strongly supported by 
literature, and generally consistent with current legal trends. But 
it also has developed into something of a consensus document, 
having been widely circulated in various versions, repeatedly 
presented to professional audiences dozens of times in Hawaii, 
and improved by countless comments and suggestions. The 
focus here is on the standards for withholding and withdrawing 
treatment. It should be noted that some important types of ethical 
problems are not covered: In particular, scarce resource prob-
lems (including some related questions involving medical futil-
ity), maternal-fetal and pediatric issues, and questions involving 
the notification of potentially affected third parties. 
Decisionally Capacitated Patients 
For decisionally capacitated patients, it can be axiomatic that 
health care professionals must secure informed consent prior to 
treatment. There is almost no debate about this issue. The little 
discussion is occurring only at the distant margins-refusals by 
pregnant women and patients with MDR TB. And even in these 
cases it cannot be said there is a consensus that contradicts the 
axiom. In essence, where informed consent has been withheld or 
withdrawn, health care professionals, lacking needed permis-
sion, are not at liberty to treat. Refusals of treatment by 
Kenneth Kipnis PhD 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Anita Gerhard MD 
Department of Psychiatry 
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decisionally capacitated, informed adults are decisive: Rela-
tives and health care professionals have no ethical or legal 
authority to overturn their medical decisions. 
Competency and Decisional Capacity 
All adults are presumed to be competent and decisionally 
capacitated. This assumption is rebuttable. In this context, the 
term "incompetency" must be distinguished from "decisional 
incapacitation," by far the more useful of the two concepts. The 
former is a legal status that is imposed by courts. A judge, 
generally following the testimony of a psychiatrist, can find an 
adult to be legally incompetent and will therefore appoint a 
guardian who is empowered to make decisions on behalf of the 
adult, now a ward. Judicial declarations of incompetency are 
rarely required in the ICU. On the other hand, capacity and 
incapacity are action-specific concepts that are often clinically 
applicable. As regards some health-care decision, a patient is 
sufficiently capacitated to make that particular decision if, at a 
minimum, he or she has the capacities 1) to understand the 
problem, 2) to understand the risks and benefits of the available 
alternatives (including no treatment), and 3) to express a choice. 
It is possible for a legally incompetent patient-for example, a 
mature minor-to be decisionally capacitated. Likewise, a com-
petent patient may be decisionally incapacitated, as when a 
patient is in denial about the medical problem. 
Informed Consent 
Consistent with this analysis of decisional capacity as a mini-
mum standard, a patient is sufficiently informed to give in-
formed consent if he or she: 
1. Understands the medical problem, 
2. understands what the health care professional proposes to 
do, 
3. understands the available alternatives, including no treat-
ment, and 
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